No. 338

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)

TO: Washington (Koshi) Action Germany and Italy as Circular # 118.

April 13, 1941

No number.

From Foreign Minister Matsuoka:

In these conversations no reference was made either by them or by us to any relationship between the Jap-Soviet neutrality pact and the Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite alliance, nor to the effect of either upon the other. We merely assumed that the neutrality agreement was being concluded on the premise that it was taken "for granted" that the Tripartite alliance was a clearly established fact and that this neutrality pact would not affect or change it in any way; and they also seemed to take the same attitude. I think there cannot possibly arise the slightest doubt on that point in the future. Please assure the Foreign Ministers of the countries to which you are accredited in regard to this matter at once.

Relayed to Tokyo, England, America, France.

Trans. 4-15-41

No.  339

FROM: Rome

TO: Moscow

April 12, 1941

# 210.

Message to Tokyo.

On the 12th, the Vice Chief of Staff of the entire Army told ANDO that the war against Greece and Yugoslavia had been even more successful than expected and that already the Italian troops in Albania had come together with the southern German army in southern Siberia (in the vicinity of Ochrida, according to official reports). Due to the concentration of large forces to the north of Belgrade the main army of the Serbians will be defeated with little action. In Libya, Tobruk is being besieged, and although the British are trying to render assistance by bringing warships from Alexandria, its collapse soon is inevitable. However, the German and Italian armies have not yet reached the Libyan-Egyptian frontier. When questioned as to whether the Italian and German forces would go on to capture Alexandria after occupying Cirenaica [a] he avoided a direct reply.

On this occasion the above-mentioned officer asked a number of questions about MATSUOKA's visit to Moscow and Russia's attitude toward Japan. It certainly is true, he said, that recent relations between Germany and Russia have not been entirely satisfactory. Doesn't it seem rather strange for Russia to go off and establish special relations with Japan? To this ANDO replied that Japan, in accordance with the ideals of the three Axis Powers, is endeavoring to get Russia to come along, and although difficulties may be encountered in achieving this, a friendly attitude on the part of Russia for Japan will certainly be a step in the desired direction.

Relay to England.

[a] A city in northern Libya.

Trans. 4-15-41

Page A-177

No. 340

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)

TO: Buenos Aires (Koshi)

April 1, 1941

# 081.

(Circular, in 2 parts—complete).

Received from Tokyo as Circular # 760, 31st.

European American reports.

1. The policy of England and the U.S. toward Japan is to make existence as difficult as possible. In stopping petroleum and food from reaching Japan, they intend to push Japan to the last extremity.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

2. Matsuoka's trip to Europe made a deep impression in England and America. The newspapers reported it as having something to do with Japan's southern expansion and said that Japan would do as Germany ordered -----.

3. America's passage of the Aid-To-Britain bill is leading America to the brink of war. As an answer Germany is stepping up her submarine war and England's shipping losses have increased sharply. According to British reports they are losing up to 20,000 tons a day. This is causing an acute food shortage in Britain.

In the Balkans, Russo-German relations seem to be the key to the Bulgarian and Turkish problems. However, what course the Soviet will take from now on is a profound secret.

Trans. 4-3-41

No. 341

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Berlin

(Revised Translation)

April 17, 1941

# 873.

(Circular)

Received from London as # 260.

The official reaction in Great Britain toward the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact was at first that in view of the exerting circumstances the pact was an effort on the part of Russia to strengthen her ties with Germany. However, later (partly due to the reaction produced in America) the pact was viewed as an effort on the part of Russia to encourage Japan to expand southward and thus come immediately into conflict with Great Britain and the U.S., and thus the pact produced no small shock. Thus, a conflict between Russia and Germany was not a thing to be hoped for in the immediate future. All of this grows out of an anxiety lest there be some secret understanding in the pact and lest Japan, Russia, and Germany have a tacit understanding in regard to the East and West.

I explained that the main purpose of the pact was, in case of necessity, to promote peace between the three countries, in particular to maintain peace in the Pacific, and that the pact had no other purpose than to promote peace and order in the Orient, and that Japan was not in cahoots with any other country.

Relayed to Washington and Europe.

Trans. 4-21-41

Page A-178

No. 342

FROM: San Francisco (Muto)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

April 15, 1941

# 057.

(Abstract)

Local newspapers report that America is shocked by the neutrality pact and dissatisfied with Russia.

Trans. 4-19-41

No. 343

FROM: Ottawa (Yoshizawa)

TO: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

April 15, 1941

# 049.

(Abstract)

To say the least, the establishment of the Jap-Soviet neutrality pact has produced a great shock here. Local newspapers are playing it up.

Trans. 4-19-41

No. 344

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

April 7, 1941

# 151.

Matsuoka's speeches in Berlin and Rome were wired here and produced no small shock. However, for my own information, I wish you would wire me the intent of his speeches.

Trans. 4-19-41

No.  345

FROM: Nanking

TO: Tokyo

April 8, 1941

# 212.

On the 7th, O SHU SEKI told HIDAKA in substance the following:

1. Judging from varied reports concerning the general situation, no notable change can be observed in the attitude of the Chungking officials. CHIANG KAI SHEK maintains his challenging attitude and is appealing for economic assistance. He appears to be determined to continue the struggle, all the while awaiting a favorable turn in the situation revolving about the European war. It is remarkable to what extent such organs as the High Commission for National Defense heed every order of CHIANG KAI SHEK.

2. The recent council meeting held here came to two conclusions after considerable discussion, namely:

a. That the military power of the Chungking government has markedly decreased;

b. That they will avoid a clash with the Japanese army.

CHIANG is endeavoring to rebuild his aerial army with assistance from the United States and, following the example of the European war, he plans to take the offensive against Japan in the air.

Page A-179

On the same day SHU FUTSU KAI told HIDAKA that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's trip to Europe is worrying Chungking very much and, since his assumption of office in Moscow, the Chinese Ambassador (?) has not been able to get a single interview with STALIN, and there is a current report that STALIN has washed his hands of CHIANG. The resignation of O CHO KEI as Vice Chief of Foreign Relations was of his own volition and the resignation of the Chief Private Secretary to the High Commission for National Defense was for the purpose of better serving O SHU SEKI. SHU FUTSU KAI in general had about the same thing to say as O SHU SEKI.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Relayed to Peking and Shanghai.

Trans. 4-21-41

No. 346

FROM: Hsinking

TO: Peking, Nanking, and Shanghai

April 18, 1941

# 72.

Circular. Message to Tokyo as # 207.

Strictly Secret.

The recent Soviet-Japanese neutrality agreement and proclamation seem to have had not a little effect upon the Manchukuoan officialdom and the new Peoples' Government in that it has removed the menace from the north. There are not a few who are greatly relieved. However, there is one group of important persons who believe that the Soviet schemes to cause a Japanese move toward the south, thus opening the way for Japanese-American hostilities. They are, therefore, of the opinion that a great deal of caution should be exercised.

That is all for the present.

Relayed to Russia, Peking, Nanking and Shanghai.

Trans. 4-21-41

No. 347

FROM: Rome

TO: Tokyo

April 19, 1941

# 233.

Regarding my message # 211 [a].

According to information received from the same source, the Apostolic Delegate in the U.S. was instructed by the Vatican to call on the President of the U.S. and relay the following opinions of the Pope to him:

The Pope got the impression that the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact was brought about by Japan in her determination to bring about a change in Soviet-Chinese relations.

Japan has made her position in the Far East as strong as her above-mentioned determination. It is important at this time to strengthen Japan's desire to maintain peace in the Far East.

In this regard, it would seem more favorable if the U.S. took a more friendly and cooperative attitude with Japan, instead of one of antagonism. It would be of advantage to the U.S. if she would aid Japan in her efforts to attain a definite position.

From the view point of aid to Britain, it would seem as if it would be to the interest of the U.S. to avoid a conflict with Japan.

Page A-180

The Vatican is prepared to give its wholehearted support to promoting a peace between Japan and Chiang Kai-Shek. There is little doubt that there is no motive except the above, behind the dispatching of a special envoy to the Vatican by China.

It is the Vatican's hope in other words, that the U.S. does everything in its power to prevent the war from becoming wider in scope, and instead that it will wield its influence in behalf of promoting peace, etc.

Relayed to Berlin, Moscow and Washington.

[a] Not yet translated.

Trans. 4-21-41

No. 348

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Berlin (Koshi)

May 1, 1941

# 363.

Regarding your # 467 [a].

On the 24th, at the Privy Council, I simply said in reply to a question put to me by a Privy Councilor:

It goes without saying that one of the chief objectives of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact is the settlement of the China Incident, looking toward a general peace. However, if the above intention leaks out to outsiders it may have an unfavorable effect on our plans. Therefore, I ask that this information be strictly limited to this group only."

I have never made the statement mentioned in the press, regarding our government's policy towards Chungking.

[a] Not available, dated about 1 May, 1941.

Trans. 5-7-41